Revisiting the \u3ci\u3eManson\u3c/i\u3e Test: Social Science as a Source of Constitutional Interpretation by Wiener, Benjamin
  
861 
REVISITING THE MANSON TEST:  SOCIAL SCIENCE AS A SOURCE 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Benjamin Wiener* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over forty-five years ago, Justice William Brennan, writing for a 
majority of the Supreme Court observed, “The vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification.”1  The advent of DNA exonera-
tions has only reinforced this insight.2  Indeed, in seventy-six percent 
of the first 250 DNA exoneration cases, the exoneree was identified 
by an eyewitness.3  According to the Innocence Project, “[e]yewitness 
misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions 
nationwide.”4 
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court 
defined the Due Process limitations on the admissibility of eyewitness 
identifications.5  The Court ultimately settled on a test in Manson v. 
Brathwaite.6  Since 1977, the Court’s test has been roundly criticized in 
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 1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
 2 DNA testing began in the 1980s.  Since that time, more than 250 people have been exon-
erated with the aid of DNA evidence.  BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:  
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 5 (2011). 
 3 Id. at 48. 
 4 THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS MISIDENTIFICATION, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
 5 See e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972) (establishing a two-part test and identify-
ing factors to be considered when evaluating the likelihood of misidentification); Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 381–82 (1968) (considering eyewitness identification 
in the context of due process); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967) (applying 
the due process standard to photographic eyewitness identification procedures).  A more 
thorough discussion of the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification opinions is provid-
ed infra pp. 860–66.  
 6 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977) (“The admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and un-
necessary identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the identifica-
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the legal7 and social science8 literature.  Despite developments in so-
cial science that have augmented our understanding of eyewitness 
identifications, the Supreme Court has failed to readdress the issue.9 
Some state supreme courts have responded to criticisms of the 
Manson test by revising the due process tests under their state consti-
tutions to reflect developments in social science.10  Most notably, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey radically amended its due process test 
 
tion possesses sufficient aspects of reliability.”).  The Court identified five factors for 
courts to examine to determine whether an identification was sufficiently reliable: 
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the 
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, 
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 
  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200. 
 7 See e.g., GARRETT, supra note 2, at 63 (describing the Supreme Court’s Manson test as 
“toothless”); Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny:  An Empirical Analysis of 
American Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 175, 191 (2012) (noting “unanimous 
opposition” among legal scholars to the Supreme Court’s approach to eyewitness evi-
dence); Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Pro-
tect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 601 (2009) (excoriating the criminal justice 
system for “continu[ing] to tolerate eyewitness identification procedures that gratuitously 
increase the risk of convicting innocent persons”); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, 
Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited:  Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 121 (2006) (“The problems with 
the Manson rule of decision are fairly obvious in light of the psychological re-
search . . . .”); David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convic-
tions:  Lets Give Science a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263, 274 (2010) (advocating for the aban-
donment of the Manson test); David E. Paseltiner, Note, Twenty-Years of Diminishing 
Protection:  A Proposal to Return to the Wade Trilogy’s Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 606 
(1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s test does not meet its goals). 
 8 See e.g., Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and 
the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science:  30 Years Later, 33 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2009) (reviewing hundreds of studies and calling the Manson test into 
question); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:  Recommendations for 
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 608 (1998) (“In legal theory, various 
safeguards are presumed to be operating within the justice system to prevent miscarriages 
of justice in the form of mistaken identification.  These safeguards, however, fail to pro-
vide the intended protection.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE:  A GUIDE 
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf (not-
ing that procedures developed by courts and other actors “have not integrated the grow-
ing body of psychological knowledge regarding eyewitness evidence with the practical 
demands of day-to-day law enforcement”). 
 9 In 2012, the Court was presented with the opportunity to revise the Manson test in Perry v. 
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).  However, the Court decided that case on narrower 
state action grounds, holding that “the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary 
judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification 
was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law en-
forcement.”  Id. at 730. 
 10 “It is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal jus-
tice system than the Federal Constitution requires.”  California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 
1013–14 (1983). 
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for the admissibility of eyewitness evidence in State v. Henderson.11  The 
Supreme Court of Oregon recently followed suit by rejecting the 
Manson test in State v. Lawson.12 
This Comment considers whether or not the United States Su-
preme Court should use social science evidence as a source for rein-
terpreting the Due Process Clause as expressed through the Manson 
test.  While many alternatives to the Manson test have been proposed 
in the academic literature, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the question of why social science findings are legitimate sources for 
interpretation of the Constitution in the case of eyewitness identifica-
tions.13  The respondent and its amici argued in Perry that it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to consider this evidence in defining the 
due process limitation on eyewitness evidence.14  In light of these ar-
guments, it is necessary, as a threshold matter, to defend the legiti-
macy of social science research as a source of constitutional interpre-
tation. 
I argue that the Supreme Court should consider social science ev-
idence in its interpretation of the Due Process Clause as it relates to 
 
 11 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 12 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012); see also United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 305 n.3 (4th Cir. 
2013) (“The New Jersey and Oregon opinions represent a growing awareness that the 
continuing soundness of the Manson test has been undermined by a substantial body of 
peer-reviewed, highly reliable scientific research.”). 
 13 Another student note has addressed the propriety of using social science evidence in as-
sessing the due process standard for the admissibility of eyewitness identification evi-
dence.  Michael R. Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process:  An Appeal for Process 
Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 681 (2002).  Headley relies 
on an appeal to the philosophy of John Rawls to argue that justice requires making eye-
witness identifications fairer.  Id. at 693–94.  My Comment will not depend on (nor ad-
dress) Rawlsian philosophy. 
 14 See Brief for Respondent at 42, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-
8974) (“[P]etitioner relies heavily upon the results of studies conducted by social scien-
tists to argue that identification evidence is generally unreliable. . . . To the extent that 
the petitioner’s arguments implicate state evidentiary rules or undermine the weight that 
identification evidence is assigned by the trier of fact in some cases, such rules and special 
jury instructions adequately address the concerns that he has raised.”).  In an amicus 
brief, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argued at length that it would be inappro-
priate for the Court to refine the Manson test to conform to social science evidence.  Brief 
for The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
17–18, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10–8974).  They argued that it 
was inappropriate to base a “constitutional rule” on a “‘decades-long research ef-
fort’ . . . which has resulted in varying conclusions and recommendations.”  Id. at 17–18.  
They went on to argue that “[t]he changeable nature of the science is reflected in scien-
tific literature,” id. at 20, and that “[t]he research and theories are not solid enough on 
which to rest a constitutional standard,” id. at 24.  They concluded that, “even if the scien-
tific and investigative community could agree on a process for obtaining the more relia-
ble identifications, the courts are not commanded to accept the procedures as a require-
ment of due process.”  Id. at 24–25.  I address these objections infra. 
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eyewitness testimony and revise the Manson test accordingly.  In Part 
I, I outline the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification case law.  In 
Part II, I discuss the approaches of state supreme courts that have 
augmented the federal standard.  In Part III, I provide a framework 
for the use of social science data in constitutional interpretation gen-
erally, paying particular attention to the work of David L. Faigman.  
In Part IV, I apply the principles outlined in the prior part to eyewit-
ness identifications, arguing that social science evidence is particular-
ly relevant to this area of the law.  Finally, I consider and reject some 
objections to the Court’s use of scientific evidence to shape the test 
for excluding eyewitness evidence. 
I.  U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Beginning in the 1960s the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionalized 
restrictions on the admissibility of eyewitness evidence through the 
Due Process Clause.  This line of cases culminated in Manson v. 
Brathwaite,15 which established the current due process test for as-
sessing such evidence. 
A.  The Wade Trilogy 
The Supreme Court first considered the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications in the context of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of 
the right to counsel.16  The Court decided three cases on the same 
day, each of which contained a challenge to the admission of evi-
dence of lineups conducted in the absence of the defense counsel.17  
In Wade, the Court held that a pretrial identification was a “critical 
stage” of the prosecution, at which defendants are entitled to have 
counsel present.18  Recognizing the unreliability of eyewitness identi-
fications, the Court observed, “[T]here is grave potential for preju-
dice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be ca-
pable of reconstruction at trial, and . . . presence of counsel itself can 
often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at tri-
al.”19 
 
 15 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
 16 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 17 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220–21 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 
271–72 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295–96 (1967). 
 18 388 U.S. at 236–37. 
 19 Id. at 235–36; see also id. at 228 (“[T]he confrontation compelled by the State between the 
accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiar-
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The Court did not, however, require that identifications made at 
uncounseled lineups be excluded per se.20  Instead, the Court allowed 
“the Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon obser-
vations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.”21  If the 
government could make such a showing, the evidence would not be 
excluded.22 
The same day that the Court decided Wade, it applied its holding 
in Gilbert v. California.23  The Court held that it was “constitutional er-
ror” to admit “in-court identifications without first determining that 
they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but were of independent 
origin.”24  The Court then held that the State was entitled to present 
evidence to prove that the eyewitnesses had “independent source[s]” 
for their in-court identifications of the defendant and remanded the 
case to the California Supreme Court to hold “such proceedings as 
[that court] may deem appropriate to afford the State the opportuni-
ty” to establish an independent source for the identification.25  The 
Court also held that the witness’s testimony regarding his out-of-court 
identifications was per se inadmissible and would result in reversal, 
unless the California Supreme Court determined that the admission 
was harmless error.26 
In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that the Wade and Gilbert deci-
sions would not be applied retroactively.27  As such, the Court did not 
apply Wade to the petitioner’s case, since he raised his claims on a pe-
tition for writ of habeas corpus.28  The Court also, for the first time, 
considered the due process29 implications of the admission of eyewit-
ness evidence.  The petitioner claimed, “[T]he confrontation con-
ducted in this case was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
 
ly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even cru-
cially, derogate from a fair trial.”). 
 20 Id. at 239–40. 
 21 Id. at 240. 
 22 Id. at 239–40. 
 23 388 U.S. 263, 265 (1967). 
 24 Id. at 272. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id at 272–74. 
 27 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). 
 28 Id. at 301. 
 29 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
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irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of 
law.”30 
In Stovall, the victim Dr. Frances Behrendt was stabbed eleven 
times.31  Two days after the stabbing, the defendant, Theodore 
Stovall, was brought to the hospital where Behrendt was recovering 
from surgery.32  Stovall was handcuffed to a police officer and 
brought into Behrendt’s room.33  He was the only black person pre-
sent.34  Behrendt identified Stovall as the perpetrator.35 
The Court, without citing any authority, stated that “a claimed vio-
lation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation de-
pends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.”36  The 
Court quoted the underlying opinion from the court of appeals and 
noted that under these circumstances, the showup37 employed in this 
case was necessary and therefore, the admission of evidence derived 
from it did not constitute a due process violation.38 
 
 30 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02. 
 31 Id. at 295. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 302.  The Court stated that a claim that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due 
process of law” was “a recognized ground of attack upon a conviction independent of any 
right to counsel claim.”   Id. at 301–02.  However, it cited only a single Fourth Circuit 
case, Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966), in support of this proposition.  In 
Palmer, the Court relied on the principle that a court may not “rely on an identification 
secured by a process in which the search for truth is made secondary to the quest for a 
conviction” without violating due process.  Id. at 202.  The court cited no authority for 
this proposition.  Id.  In his merits brief, Stovall cited only a Canadian case in support of 
his argument that the identification to which he was subject violated due process.  Brief 
for Petitioner at 14–15, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (No. 254) (citing Rex v. 
Smierciak, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 156, 157–58 (Can. Ont.)). 
 37 A “showup” is “[a] pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is confronted with 
a witness to or the victim of a crime.  Unlike a lineup, a showup is a one-on-one confron-
tation.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1506 (9th ed. 2009). 
 38 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.  The Court considered these factors in its totality analysis:   
Here was the only person in the world who could possibly exonerate Stovall.  Her 
words, and only her words, ‘He is not the man’ could have resulted in freedom for 
Stovall.  The hospital was not far distant from the courthouse and jail.  No one 
knew how long Mrs. Behrendt might live.  Faced with the responsibility of identify-
ing the attacker, with the need for immediate action and with the knowledge that 
Mrs. Behrendt could not visit the jail, the police followed the only feasible proce-
dure and took Stovall to the hospital room.  Under these circumstances, the usual 
police station line-up, which Stovall now argues he should have had, was out of the 
question.   
  Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735 (1966)). 
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B.  Developments in the Due Process Exclusion of Eyewitness Evidence 
Just one year after the Wade trilogy was decided, the Court revisit-
ed and developed the due process status of eyewitness evidence in 
Simmons v. United States.39  In Simmons, eyewitnesses had identified 
photographs of the petitioners.40  Thomas Simmons claimed, “[I]n 
the circumstances the identification procedure was so unduly preju-
dicial as fatally to taint his conviction.”41  As in Stovall, the Court eval-
uated Simmons’s claim in light of the “totality of the surrounding cir-
cumstances.”42 
The Court listed some of the conditions that may lead to an im-
proper identification.43  The Court found, however, that cross-
examination would be sufficient to remedy most of the dangers of er-
roneous identifications.44  Thus, under the totality of the circum-
stances, Simmons’s due process rights had not been violated45 and 
that the identification procedure was not “unnecessary” since “[a] se-
rious felony had been committed” and “[t]he perpetrators were still 
at large.”46  Moreover, the Court concluded, “[T]here was in the cir-
cumstances of this case little chance that the procedure utilized led to 
misidentification of Simmons.”47  This was because the lighting dur-
ing the robbery was good,48 the robbers were not disguised,49 five wit-
nesses identified Simmons,50 the photographs were shown to the wit-
nesses “while their memories were still fresh,”51 and law enforcement 
did not suggest to the defendants which people in the photographs 
were under suspicion.52 
The next year, in Foster v. California,53 the Court held, for the first 
time, that a lineup was so unfair as to violate due process.  In Foster, 
 
 39 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 
 40 Id. at 382. 
 41 Id. at 383. 
 42 Id. 
 43 These included viewing the perpetrator for a short period of time; showing the witness a 
single photograph resembling their description; and the police telling the witness that 
they have corroborating evidence.  Id. at 383–84 (citing PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 74–77, 82–83 (1965)). 
 44 Id. at 384. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 385. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 394 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1969). 
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the petitioner was the only person in the lineup wearing a leather 
jacket similar to that worn by the perpetrator.54  The witness was una-
ble to make an identification, so the police set up a one-on-one con-
frontation between the witness and the petitioner.55  The witness was 
still unable to make an identification.56  The police conducted anoth-
er lineup three days later.  The petitioner was the only person who 
was in both lineups.  Only at this second lineup was he identified.57  
Under these circumstances, the Court held, “The suggestive elements 
in [the] identification procedure made it all but inevitable that [the 
eyewitness] would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact 
‘the man.’”58  As such, the Court held that the procedure was so un-
necessarily suggestive as to violate the defendant’s due process 
rights.59 
The Court substantially refined the test, establishing the contem-
porary standard, in Neil v. Biggers.60  According to the majority, 
“[s]ome general guidelines” could be gleaned from the Court’s pre-
vious cases.61  First, according to the Court, its past judgments were 
intended to avoid misidentifications.62  A showing of suggestiveness 
was not, however, sufficient for a court to exclude the challenged evi-
dence.63  The Court held that eyewitness evidence should be admitted 
if “under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was re-
liable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”64  
The Court then listed five factors to use in determining whether an 
identification is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in spite of a sug-
gestive identification procedure:  (1) the opportunity of the witness 
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree 
of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the 
criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 443. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 409 U.S. 188, 198–200 (1972). 
 61 Id. at 196–98. 
 62 Id. at 198. 
 63 Id at 198–99. 
 64 Id. at 199. 
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confrontation.65  The Court failed to cite any sources for these fac-
tors.66 
The Court’s final distillation of the due process test for the exclu-
sion of eyewitness evidence came in Manson v. Brathwaite, where it 
clarified that the test consisted of two parts.67  Evidence of an eyewit-
ness identification is not excluded “per se” when the defendant shows 
that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive.68  According to the 
Court, “[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility 
of identification testimony.”69  Therefore, the Court should examine 
the totality of the circumstances, focusing on the factors outlined in 
Biggers in order to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently reli-
able to be admitted, despite the use of a suggestive identification pro-
cedure.70 
Since 1977, the Court has not revised its due process test, despite 
numerous calls for it to do so.71  In 2012, the Court declined to read-
dress the Manson framework in Perry v. New Hampshire.72  Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, in dissent, noted that “[a] vast body of scientific literature 
 
 65 Id. at 199–200. 
 66 The Court may have been influenced by its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Two 
years prior to Biggers, the Court had engaged in a similar analysis in its interpretation of 
the Confrontation Clause in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88–89 (1970).  According to the 
Court, a declarant’s statements could be introduced even when the defendant had no 
opportunity to confront the declarant if they carried sufficient “indicia of reliability.”  Id. 
at 89.  In Dutton, the disputed statement was one that identified the defendant.  Id. at 88.  
According to the Court, “there was no denial of the right of confrontation as to this ques-
tion of identity,” since “the statement contained no express assertion about past fact,” the 
declarant had “personal knowledge” of the identity of the defendant, “the possibility that 
[the declarant’s] statement was founded on faulty recollection [was] remote in the ex-
treme,” and the “circumstances” gave no reason to suppose that the declarant was lying.  
Id. at 88–89.  As in Biggers, the Court did not cite any sources to support its determination 
that these factors were indeed indicative of reliability.  Cf. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA 153 (2d ed. 1923) (“The theory of the Hearsay rule . . . is that the 
many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the 
bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if they ex-
ist, by the test of cross-examination.  But this test or security may in a given instance be 
superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in that instance, that the statement offered is free 
from the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination 
would be a work of supererogation.”). 
 67 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
 68 Id. at 109, 113–14. 
 69 Id. at 114.  That is to say, a defendant’s due process rights are not violated simply by being 
subject to a suggestive police procedure.  Due process is subverted only when that proce-
dure results in the admission of unreliable evidence at trial. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 72 132 S. Ct. 716, 724–25 (2012). 
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has reinforced every concern our precedents articulated nearly a half-
century ago.”73  She went on to observe,  
  The empirical evidence demonstrates that eyewitness misidentifica-
tion is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.  
Researchers have found that a staggering 76% of the first 250 convictions 
overturned due to DNA evidence since 1989 involved eyewitness misiden-
tification.  Study after study demonstrates that eyewitness recollections 
are highly susceptible to distortion by postevent information or social 
cues; that jurors routinely overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identi-
fications; that jurors place the greatest weight on eyewitness confidence 
in assessing identifications even though confidence is a poor gauge of ac-
curacy; and that suggestiveness can stem from sources beyond police-
orchestrated procedures.74 
In spite of these observations, Manson continues to provide the 
test that federal courts use in assessing the constitutionality of admit-
ting eyewitness evidence. 
II.  STATE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Some state supreme courts have modified the United States Su-
preme Court’s test.75  New York and Massachusetts courts adopted the 
“per se” exclusionary rule that the United States Supreme Court re-
jected in Biggers.  With regards to eyewitness evidence, the New York 
Court of Appeals has “interpreted the Due Process Clause of the New 
York Constitution differently” from the way the United States Su-
preme Court has interpreted the United States Constitution.76  Evi-
dence of an out-of-court identification derived from a suggestive 
lineup procedure is excluded per se.77  However, witnesses are per-
mitted to identify the defendant in court “if that identification is 
based on an independent source.”78  The test in Massachusetts is the 
same.79 
 
 73 Id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 74 Id. at 738–39 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75 See O’Toole & Shay, supra note 7, at 115 (“Some state courts have attempted to respond 
to the criticism of Manson by interpreting their state constitution or other state law to 
provide more protection than Manson.”). 
 76 People v. Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 2009). 
 77 People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981). 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Commonwealth v. Watson, 915 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Mass. 2009) (“If a defendant sus-
tains his burden of showing that a given identification was unnecessarily suggestive, then 
the Commonwealth may not introduce a subsequent identification by the same witness 
absent clear and convincing evidence that the subsequent identification had an inde-
pendent source and was not merely the product of the prior suggestive confrontation.”). 
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A few states have responded more directly to criticism of Manson.  
Kansas and Utah have adopted tests that are similar to the Manson 
test, but have made modifications to the factors to be considered un-
der the totality of the circumstances.  The Utah Supreme Court, in 
State v. Ramirez, adopted the following five-factor test in place of the 
Manson test: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
(3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or her physi-
cal and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness’s identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed 
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly.  This last area includes such factors as whether the event was 
an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was ob-
served, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer’s.80 
The Kansas Supreme Court adopted the Ramirez test in State v. Hunt.81 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court abandoned the Manson test in State 
v. Dubose.82  The court began its analysis by recognizing the “new in-
formation” that had been assembled in the social science literature83 
and cited evidence from that literature calling into question the Man-
son test.84  “In light of such evidence,” the court adopted a new test.85  
According to the court, “[E]vidence obtained from an out-of-court 
showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was neces-
sary.”86  The court explained, “A showup will not be necessary, howev-
er, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a 
 
 80 State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 
(Utah 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 69 P.3d 571, 576 (Kan. 2003). 
 82 699 N.W.2d 582, 594 (Wis. 2005). 
 83 Id. at 591–92. 
 84 Id. (citing Tiffany Hinz & Kathy Pezdek, The Effect of Exposure to Multiple Lineups on Face 
Identification Accuracy, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (2001); Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness 
Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations:  A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 523 (2003); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the 
Suspect”:  Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277 (2003); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:  
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 603 (1998); Winn S. 
Collins, Comment, Improving Eyewitness Evidence Collection Procedures in Wisconsin, 2003 WIS. 
L. REV. 529; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:  CASE 
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 8). 
 85 Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 592–93. 
 86 Id. at 593–94. 
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result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a 
lineup or photo array.”87 
Perhaps the most significant reforms are those adopted by the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey in State v. Henderson.88  The court, in con-
sidering whether to amend its due process test, appointed a Special 
Master to “evaluate scientific and other evidence about eyewitness 
identifications.”89  The Special Master heard testimony from seven 
experts and reviewed hundreds of scientific studies, which produced 
2,000 pages of transcripts.90  Based on this evidence, the court con-
cluded, “[T]he current standard for assessing eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence does not fully meet its goals.  It does not offer an ade-
quate measure for reliability or sufficiently deter inappropriate police 
conduct.  It also overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate evi-
dence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is 
accurate.”91 
The court then proceeded to review, in detail, the scientific litera-
ture relating to eyewitness identifications.  In light of this evidence, 
the court fashioned a new test.  “First, . . . a defendant has the initial 
burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to 
a mistaken identification.”92  Second, “the State must then offer proof 
to show that the proffered eyewitness identification is reliable—
accounting for system and estimator variables.”93  Third, “the ultimate 
burden remains on the defendant to prove a very substantial likeli-
hood of irreparable misidentification.”94  Then, “if after weighing the 
evidence presented a court finds from the totality of the circumstanc-
es that [the] defendant has demonstrated a very substantial likeli-
hood of irreparable misidentification, the court should suppress the 
identification evidence.”95 
More important than changing the structure of the test, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court identified a number of variables that social sci-
entists have shown to be more closely tied to reliability for trial courts 
to examine in their “totality of the circumstances” inquiries.  These 
include (1) blind administration, (2) pre-identification instructions, 
(3) lineup construction, (4) feedback, (5) recording confidence, (6) 
 
 87 Id. at 594. 
 88 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 89 Id. at 877. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 878. 
 92 Id. at 920. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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multiple viewings, (7) showups, (8) private actors, (9) other identifi-
cations made, (10) stress, (11) weapon focus, (12) duration, (13) dis-
tance and lighting, (14) witness characteristics, (15) characteristics of 
the perpetrator, (16) memory decay, and (17) race-bias.96  These re-
forms were significant and based on a substantial degree of fact-
finding by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon has also recently amended its due 
process test for eyewitness identifications in response to social science 
criticism of the Manson test.97  The court revised its test to accommo-
date “considerable developments in both the law and the science on 
which this court previously relied in determining the admissibility of 
eyewitness identification evidence.”98  The court recognized, “Since 
1979, . . . there have been more than 2,000 scientific studies conduct-
ed on the reliability of eyewitness identification,”99 and took “judicial 
notice” of this social science data.100  The court, however, revised its 
test based on evidentiary, rather than due process, grounds.101 
As discussed supra, the United States Supreme Court has refused 
to acknowledge the social science data that calls into question the ef-
ficacy of its due process test.  It has not, as the state supreme courts of 
New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Kansas, Utah, New Jersey, and 
Oregon have done, reevaluated its standards for the exclusion of un-
reliable eyewitness evidence.  The rest of this Comment will argue 
that the Supreme Court should reassess the Manson test in light of 
this data. 
III.  A FRAMEWORK FOR USING SOCIAL SCIENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
A.  History of the Use of Social Science in Constitutional Interpretation 
The United States Supreme Court has only recently begun to con-
sider social science102 in interpreting the Constitution.  Before the 
1920s, the Court’s formalist normative commitments excluded social 
 
 96 Id. at 920–22. 
 97 State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
 98 Id. at 678. 
 99 Id. at 685. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 696–97. 
102 According to Amy Rublin, “‘Social science’ refers to the work of people from myriad 
fields who utilize different methods to analyze and explain social phenomena and rest 
their explanations on a scientific basis.”  Amy Rublin, The Role of Social Science in Judicial 
Decision Making:  How Gay Rights Advocates Can Learn from Integration and Capital Punishment 
Case Law, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 179, 179–80 (2011). 
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science as a relevant area of judicial inquiry.103  Michael Rustad and 
Thomas Koenig argue that the rise of the realist movement changed 
this paradigm.104  In his famous article The Path of the Law, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. heralded the paradigm shift, declaring,  
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of 
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the 
master of economics.  It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of 
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.105   
Early proponents of using social sciences in the law included Hugo 
Mustenberg, Karl Llewellyn, and Benjamin Cardozo.106 
In a brief filed in Muller v. Oregon,107 Louis Brandeis used social 
science evidence to argue in favor of the constitutionality of a law lim-
iting women’s working hours.108  After Muller, the Court grew more 
receptive to using social science evidence in constitutional interpreta-
tion.109  In Brown v. Board of Education,110 the Court relied on social sci-
ence studies to justify its holding.111  Since Brown, the Court has relied 
on social science data in decisions “concerning school desegregation, 
obscenity, segregation by gender, jury size, discriminatory death pen-
alty, death-qualified juries, juvenile delinquency, discrimination, and 
Eighth Amendment death penalty challenges.”112 
 
103 Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:  Selective Dis-
tortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 100–01 (1993). 
104 Id.  For a more thorough examination of realist jurisprudence, see generally BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE:  THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 
(2010). 
105 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
106 Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science “Researcher’s 
Black Arts,” 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 106 (2003). 
107 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
108 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 103, at 105–06.  The “Brandeis brief” included “extracts 
from over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, 
inspectors of factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect that long hours of 
labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special physical organization.”  
Muller, 208 U.S. at 420 n.1.  For an examination of Muller from a feminist perspective, see 
Sybil Lipschultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse:  1908–1923, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
131, 134–39 (1989). 
109 See Fradella, supra note 106, at 107 (“Largely as a result of the changes that occurred as a 
function of the New Deal, ‘[b]y the 1930’s, classifying social science as fact was deeply in-
grained in the thinking of the Court,’ and the amicus brief became the mechanism for 
receiving social fact into judicial decision-making.” (quoting John Monahan & Laurens 
Walker, Social Authority:  Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. 
PA. L. REV. 477, 481 (1986))). 
110 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
111 Fradella, supra note 106, at 107. 
112 Id. at 108 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Most recently, the Court has relied on social science evidence to 
develop the restrictions the Eighth Amendment113 places on the pun-
ishment of juvenile criminal offenders.  In Roper v. Simmons, the Su-
preme Court held that it was impermissible under the Eighth 
Amendment to execute a juvenile offender who was older than fif-
teen but younger than eighteen when he committed a capital 
crime.114  According to the Court, in construing the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishments, the Court must “refer[] to 
‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate 
as to be cruel and unusual.”115 
The Court relied on social science evidence in order to determine 
that “[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and 
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be 
classified among the worst offenders.”116  First, the Court determined 
that juveniles are unusually reckless.117  Next, it noted that juveniles 
are “more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pres-
sures” because they “have less control, or less experience with con-
trol, over their own environment.”118  Finally, the Court observed that 
“[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”119 
According to the Court, the differences between juveniles and 
adults, illuminated by social science, “render[ed] suspect any conclu-
sion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.”120  The Court, 
noting a rule “forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient 
under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder,” held that “[i]f 
trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and obser-
vation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juve-
nile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude 
that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver con-
demnation—that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.”121 
 
113 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
114 543 U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005). 
115 Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
116 Id. at 569. 
117 Id. (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence:  A Developmental Perspective, 12 
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)). 
118 Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:  
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)). 
119 Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY:  YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 573. 
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The Court extended Roper to hold that a juvenile could not be 
sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime in 
Graham v. Florida.122  The Court reaffirmed the validity of the social 
science evidence that supported Roper.123  In Miller v. Alabama, the 
Court held that juveniles could not be subject to a mandatory sen-
tencing scheme that “mandates life in prison without possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders.”124  Again, the Court referenced the so-
cial science findings in Roper.125 
Despite this rise in the use of social science, some have argued 
that the Court’s reliance on social science data is waning.  After con-
ducting an empirical study of Supreme Court decisions, Henry F. 
Fradella concluded, “[I]t appears as if the heyday of social science as 
persuasive evidence in courts of law is firmly in the past.  Moreover, it 
seems unlikely that the courts will re-embrace the social sciences in 
the near future.”126  Amy Rublin concludes that, in the area of gay 
rights, “a growing national consensus is likely to be more persuasive 
to the Court than social science findings.”127  However, she maintains 
that “there is little doubt that social science will continue to influ-
ence” decisions about gay rights and other areas.128 
 
122 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
123 Id. at 2026 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Rop-
er about the nature of juveniles.  As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in psychol-
ogy and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds.”). 
124 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
125 Id. at 2464 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
126 Fradella, supra note 106, at 170. 
127 Rublin, supra note 102, at 220; see also Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opin-
ion Influence the Supreme Court?  Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
263, 263–64 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence tracks public opinion, but 
proposing that the Justices do not directly respond to public opinion, but instead that 
their views are shaped by the same forces that shape public opinion). 
128 Rublin, supra note 102, at 222; see also Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family 
Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Promoting the Well–Being of Children Whose Parents Are Gay 
or Lesbian, 131 PEDIATRICS 827, 827 (2013) (supporting marriage equality as a matter of 
policy in light of “extensive scientific literature” indicating that “children’s well-being is 
affected much more by their relationships with their parents, their parents’ sense of 
competence and security, and the presence of social and economic support for the family 
than by the gender or the sexual orientation of their parents.” (citation omitted) (inter-
nal citations omitted)), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/
2013/03/18/peds.2013-0376.full.pdf+html. 
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B.  A Framework for the Use of Social Science Data in Constitutional Decision-
Making 
Normative principles demand that the Supreme Court consider 
social science evidence in some situations when interpreting the Con-
stitution.  David L. Faigman has developed a model for analyzing 
when such evidence is an appropriate source of constitutional inter-
pretation.129  According to Faigman, “The role of social science in the 
legal process remains confused . . . due to the lack of a standard by 
which to measure its relevance.”130  Faigman’s basic framework is 
quite simple.  He argues that the standard by which the general legal 
relevance of social science research can be judged “should depend 
on [its] scientific strength, that is, on the ability of social scientists to 
answer validly the questions posed to them.”131 
Faigman, however, has a more specific view of when social science 
research is an appropriate source for constitutional interpretation.  He 
identifies a number of sources of constitutional interpretation includ-
ing “the text, original intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship, 
and contemporary values.”132  Faigman emphasizes, however, that in 
interpreting the Constitution, the Court must engage in fact-finding.  
It is in this fact-finding process that empirical research is relevant to 
constitutional interpretation.133 
Faigman bases his analysis of “constitutional fact-finding” on the 
scholarship of Kenneth Culp Davis.134  Davis distinguished between 
two kinds of facts:  legislative and adjudicative.  Legislative facts are 
those that “inform legislative judgment,” that is, those facts that are 
relevant to questions of “law or policy.”135  These facts are to be con-
trasted with “adjudicative facts.”  According to Davis, “[F]acts con-
cerning immediate parties—what the parties did, what the circum-
stances were, what the background conditions were— . . . may con-
conveniently be called adjudicative facts.”136 
 
129 See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS:  A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”:  
Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 
(1991); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not:  Assessing the Value of Social Science to the 
Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989). 
130 Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 129, at 1009. 
131 Id. at 1009–10 (footnote omitted). 
132 Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding,” supra note 129, at 548. 
133 Id. at 551. 
134 Id. at 552 (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administra-
tive Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942)). 
135 Davis, supra note 134, at 402. 
136 Id. 
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Professor Faigman has built on this distinction.  He refines the 
category of legislative facts into categories of legislative facts particu-
larly relevant for constitutional interpretation.  According to Faig-
man, “Constitutional doctrinal facts are advanced to substantiate a par-
ticular interpretation of the Constitution.”137  These facts go to the 
meaning of the Constitution itself and include the text, original in-
tent, constitutional structure, precedent, scholarship, and contempo-
rary values.138  Faigman then identifies “constitutional reviewable facts.”  
These facts are examined “under the pertinent constitutional rule or 
standard to determine the constitutionality of some state or federal 
action.  Reviewable facts transcend particular disputes and thus can 
recur.”139  Finally, “constitutional case-specific facts” are those that “are 
relevant to the application of constitutional rules in particular cas-
es.”140  Where the Court needs to answer empirical questions in order 
to engage in constitutional fact-finding, it is appropriate for the 
Court to consider social science evidence. 
Professor Faigman argues that constitutional fact-finding is partic-
ularly appropriate in cases where there is “difficulty in choosing 
which constitutional principle to rely upon.”141  Therefore, where 
there are overlapping constitutional principles, social science evi-
dence may be particularly appropriate to constitutional interpreta-
tion.  Faigman cites Brown as a primary example of this sort of case.  
According to Faigman, “[No] traditional principle[] of constitutional 
adjudication . . . squarely supports the decision and several indicate a 
contrary result.”142  In this context, constitutional fact-finding filled 
the void created by the law and provided a basis for the Court’s deci-
sion. 
IV.  SOCIAL SCIENCE IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN RESOLVING THE 
APPROPRIATE DUE PROCESS TEST FOR THE ADMISSION OF EYEWITNESS 
EVIDENCE 
A.  The Social Science Supporting a Change in the Manson Test Is Reliable 
and Well-Established 
 As discussed supra, it is essential for Faigman that the social sci-
ence that provides support for constitutional fact-finding must be re-
 
137 FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 129, at 46. 
138 Id. at 47. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 48. 
141 Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding,” supra note 129, at 567. 
142 Id. 
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liable.  Contrary to the assertions of respondent’s amici in Perry,143 the 
reliability of the social science evidence with respect to eyewitness 
identifications is unassailable.  According to psychologist Gary Wells, 
“[H]undreds of eyewitness experiments have been published in peer-
reviewed journals, many of which bear on issues in Manson.”144  These 
studies are based on “the experimental model that psychology long 
ago borrowed from other sciences, such as biology and physics.”145  
The generalizability of eyewitness evidence across age groups has 
been confirmed by empirical research.146  The reliability of research 
concerning eyewitness evidence has also been recognized by numer-
ous courts.147  Professor Faigman described the “proliferation of stud-
ies on eyewitness identification.”148  And, “[U]nlike the study of com-
plex legal and psychological issues, such as the coercive impact of 
religiously inspired prayer at graduation ceremonies, eyewitness per-
ception requires little legal sophistication and is relatively easy to re-
search.”149  The scientific and legal consensus clearly demonstrates 
that scientific research regarding eyewitness identification is suffi-
ciently reliable to serve as the basis of a finding of constitutional fact. 
 
143 See supra note 14. 
144 Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 8, at 1. 
145 Id. at 5. 
146 Steven Penrod & Brian H. Bornstein, Generalizing Eyewitness Reliability Research, in 2 THE 
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY:  MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 529, 538 (Rod C.L. Lindsay 
et al. eds., 2007); Thomas E. O’Rourke et al., The External Validity of Eyewitness Identification 
Research:  Generalizing Across Subject Populations, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 392 (1989). 
147 See United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009) (examining confidence-
accuracy relationship and effects of memory decay), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1137 (2010); 
United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142–44 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting the “inherent un-
reliability” of eyewitness identifications and the accuracy-confidence relationship); United 
States v. Smith, 621 F.Supp. 2d 1207, 1215–17 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (discussing cross-racial 
identifications, impact of high stress, and feedback); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 
1220–22 (Ariz. 1983) (discussing memory decay, stress, feedback, and confidence-
accuracy); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1984) (“The consistency of the 
results of [eyewitness identification] studies is impressive, and the courts can no longer 
remain oblivious to their implications for the administration of justice.”), overruled on other 
grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000); Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 
1257, 1265–68 (D.C. 2009) (citing expert consensus regarding system and estimator vari-
ables); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (N.J. 2011) (“We find that the scientific evi-
dence presented is both reliable and useful.”); People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 380 
(N.Y. 2007) (discussing the confidence-accuracy relationship, feedback, and confidence 
malleability); State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299–300, 302 (Tenn. 2007) (discussing 
weapons effect, stress, cross-racial identification, age, and opportunity to view); State v. 
Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1113 n.22 (Utah 2009) (citing with approval research on multi-
ple system and estimator variables). 
148 FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 129, at 28. 
149 Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
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B.  Criminal Due Process Is Sufficiently Open-Ended to Make Reliance on 
Constitutional Facts Desirable 
As was true with the equal protection analysis in Brown and the 
Eighth Amendment analysis in Roper, constitutional interpretation 
surrounding criminal due process does not have a firm doctrinal 
grounding.  Niki Kuckes has examined the Supreme Court’s criminal 
due process precedent.150  According to Kuckes, “While the Court’s 
civil and administrative precedents express a clear due process ap-
proach, . . . no single doctrinal approach to procedural due process 
emerges from the Court’s criminal decisions.”151  Kuckes goes on to 
say, “[T]o the extent a dominant approach is reflected in the Court’s 
recent criminal cases, it suggests that the process due in criminal cas-
es should be heavily influenced by historic tradition, but this doctrine 
has neither the clarity nor the consistency of the civil due process 
test.”152 
This doctrinal confusion is reflected in the Court’s eyewitness 
identification decisions.  In Stovall, the Court described the petition-
er’s challenge to the lineup on the grounds that it was so unnecessari-
ly suggestive as to violate due process as a “recognized ground of at-
tack upon a conviction independent of any right to counsel claim.”153  
The only authority that the Court cited for this proposition was Palm-
er v. Peyton,154 a Fourth Circuit case from the previous year.155  The 
Court provided no rationale outside of this “recognized ground of at-
tack” that the Due Process Clause could require the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained from a suggestive eyewitness procedure. 
The Court’s eyewitness identification due process jurisprudence is 
part and parcel of its muddled approach to criminal due process 
more generally.  In this context, the traditional sources of authority 
that inform the Court of constitutional doctrinal facts are unavaila-
ble.  The Court has not said why, as a formal matter, a matter of 
precedent, or a matter of original intent the Due Process Clause 
means that unreliable evidence obtained through suggestive proce-
dures should be excluded.  If the Court had relied on one of these 
more traditional sources of constitutional interpretation in establish-
 
150 Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006). 
151 Id. at 14. 
152 Id. at 15–16 (footnote omitted). 
153 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
154 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). 
155 Palmer, remarkably, cited no authority for the proposition that suggestive police proce-
dures conducive to mistaken identifications could be violative of the Due Process Clause. 
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ing the Manson test, modern courts might look to it assessing the con-
tinuing validity of the test. 
In the absence of such a rationale, however, constitutional review-
able facts are the only ones available to resolve disputes over the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause in this area.  Since social science 
evidence provides facts of this kind and the social science evidence in 
the realm of eyewitness identification is reliable, it would be appro-
priate for the Court to consider it in refining the Manson test. 
C.  The Test Established by the Supreme Court Presents an Empirical Question 
That Should Be Resolved by Social Science 
Not only is the criminal due process jurisprudence vague enough 
that social science evidence should be used to resolve the doctrine, 
the test that the Supreme Court established for excluding eyewitness 
evidence under the Due Process Clause creates empirical questions 
that can best be resolved by reference to social science facts.  Accord-
ing to Manson, there are two questions that need to be addressed in 
order to decide whether the admission of eyewitness evidence will vi-
olate the Due Process Clause.  First, the Court must decide whether 
the pretrial procedure was “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise 
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”156  
Second, the Court must decide whether the identification was suffi-
ciently reliable that its admission would not violate due process.157 
The first question can only be resolved with reference to constitu-
tional reviewable facts.  Courts must decide which procedures are so 
suggestive that they give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentifi-
cation.  The Constitution itself has nothing to say on this topic.  At 
this point, there may be sufficient precedent to guide lower courts in 
determining which procedures are suggestive enough to satisfy the 
test.  However, the question is really an empirical one:  what sorts of 
identification procedures will lead to a risk that witnesses will make 
false identifications? 
This answer can be and has been answered by social scientists.  
They have proved that undergoing multiple identification proce-
dures,158 seeing a mugshot before undergoing the procedure,159 failing 
 
156 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 122 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 Id. at 106 (majority opinion). 
158 Ryan D. Godfrey & Steven E. Clark, Repeated Eyewitness Identification Procedures:  Memory, 
Decision Making, and Probative Value, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 256 (2010). 
159 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure Effects:  Retroactive Interference, Mugshot 
Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 
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to engage in “double blind” lineup procedures,160 failing to provide 
unbiased pre-identification instructions,161 the construction of the 
lineup, administrator feedback,162 having the witness compose a com-
posite,163 and presenting the witness with a “show-up”164 can affect the 
likelihood that the witness will misidentify the suspect.  These studies 
go directly to answering an empirical question that is at the heart of 
the constitutional analysis of what procedures violate due process.  As 
such, the Court should make use of them in analyzing this constitu-
tional question. 
Much the same can be said for the second part of the Manson in-
quiry.  Lower courts are directed to decide “whether under the ‘total-
ity of the circumstances’ the identification was reliable even though 
the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”165  According to the 
Court, “reliability is the linchpin” of this analysis.166  The factors iden-
tified by the Court are intended to provide a guide to lower courts as 
to what constitutional, case-specific facts they should adduce in order 
to determine whether due process has been violated in a particular 
case.  However, the question of what factors, as part of a totality of the 
circumstances, contribute to the reliability of a given identification is 
empirical.  It must be answered with reference to constitutional re-
viewable facts. 
As in the first Manson prong, these facts about what makes a given 
identification reliable have been established by reliable social science 
research.  Psychologists have identified weapons focus,167 presence of 
a disguise,168 cross-racial identification,169 and stress170 as factors that 
 
299 (2006); Charles A. Goodsell et al., Effects of Mugshot Commitment on Lineup Performance 
in Young and Older Adults, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 788, 789 (2009). 
160 Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera, Instruction Bias and Lineup Presentation Mod-
erate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
70, 71 (2009). 
161 Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall:  A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 285–86, 294 (1997). 
162 Wells & Bradfield, supra note 84, at 360. 
163 Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Facial Composite Production by Eyewitnesses, 16 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 6, 6–7 (2007). 
164 A. Daniel Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 20 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 459, 464 (1996). 
165 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
166 Id. at 114. 
167 Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 413, 413 (1992). 
168 BRIAN L. CUTLER & MARGARET BULL KOVERA, EVALUATING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 43 
(2010); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Identification:  The Role of System 
and Estimator Variables, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 240, 244–45 (1987). 
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affect the reliability of eyewitness identification.  Moreover, social sci-
ence research has revealed that one of the Biggers factors, certainty, is 
not correlated with reliability.171  This reliable evidence has given clear 
answers to the empirical question that the Manson test requires courts 
to resolve.  As such, these findings are relevant and should be relied 
upon in judicial interpretation of the Due Process Clause. 
The Court should look to social science research in interpreting 
when the Due Process clause proscribes the admission of eyewitness 
evidence.  In general, criminal due process is not governed by clear 
principles.  More specifically, the Court did not cite traditional 
sources of constitutional interpretation in establishing the Manson 
test.  As such, it is appropriate for the Court to engage in constitu-
tional fact-finding to determine the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause in the context of criminal due process.  More specifically, the 
Court’s precedent asks courts to make inquiries that can be illumi-
nated by social science research.  It is appropriate and normatively 
desirable for the Court to use social science evidence in determining 
the meaning of the Due Process Clause as it relates to eyewitness evi-
dence. 
V.  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO USING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
A.  Tying Constitutional Analysis to Scientific Findings Will Create an 
Unstable Standard 
Some have objected that tying constitutional principles to social 
science findings creates a moving target that will render the law per-
petually unsettled and will fail to provide guidance to lower courts 
and law enforcement.172  According to Professor Faigman, this criti-
 
169 Tara Anthony et al., Cross-Racial Facial Identification:  A Social Cognitive Integration, 18 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296, 299 (1992); Robert K. Bothwell et al., Cross-
Racial Identification, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 19, 19, 23 (1989); Henry F. 
Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 
2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007). 
170 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewit-
ness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 687, 699 (2004). 
171 Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Eyewitness Identification:  
Effects of Lineup Instructions, Foil Similarity, and Target-Absent Base Rates, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.:  APPLIED 11, 11 (2006); Steven M. Smith et al., Postdictors of Eyewitness Errors:  
Can False Identifications Be Diagnosed?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 542, 548 (2000). 
172 The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation made this very objection in its amicus brief in 
support of the respondent in Perry.  Brief of Amicus Curiae of The Criminal Justice Legal 
Foundation in Support of Respondent at 24, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 
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cism was leveled at Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion in Roe 
v. Wade.173  Faigman observes, “Critics complain that attaching consti-
tutional meaning to scientific opinion, even when scientists are in 
consensus, condemns the Constitution to fluctuations in meaning as 
scientific knowledge changes.”174 
In Roe, the Court found that “the right of personal privacy in-
cludes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and 
must be considered against important state interests in regulation.”175  
The Court then held that “[w]ith respect to the State’s important and 
legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viabil-
ity.  This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of 
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”176  Thus, a state could 
place limitations on abortion rights after the first trimester.177  Justice 
Blackmun based his decision on scientific facts.  He “immersed him-
self in research at the huge Mayo Clinic medical library” before writ-
ing his opinion.178  Blackmun’s reliance on scientific principles was 
widely criticized.  In her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that, due 
to the developing nature of medical science, “[t]he Roe frame-
work . . . is clearly on a collision course with itself.”179 
Professor Faigman, however, has convincingly argued that 
“Blackmun’s error in Roe does not come from attaching the funda-
mental right of choice to empirical fact, but rather from failing to 
sufficiently articulate the constitutional principles underlying that 
right.”180  As such, the constitutional standard itself was subject to fluc-
tuation with any change in the empirical fact.  Since there was no 
clear constitutional principal, the only guidance lower courts had was 
viability. 
 
(2012) (No. 10-8974) (“The research and theories are not solid enough on which to rest 
a constitutional standard.”). 
173 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
174 Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding,” supra note 129, at 573. 
175 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
176 Id. at 163. 
177 Id. 
178 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 229 
(1979); see also LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN:  HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 90 (2005) (“Blackmun visited the Mayo Clinic library, where 
the staff had set aside a place for him to work and compiled a stack of books and articles 
on the history and practice of abortion.  In long-hand on a lined pad, he took careful 
notes, numbering each factual assertion and marking the citation for each.”). 
179 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
180  Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Factfinding,” supra n. 129 at 574. 
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This is not a problem in the realm of eyewitness identification.  
The Supreme Court has, in the case of the due process standard for 
eyewitness identification, identified the principles that provide the 
contours of the right at stake.  Defendants have the right not to be 
subject to suggestive procedures to the extent that they are likely to 
produce unreliable identifications.  Here, the empirical evidence will 
not change the constitutional standard.  Rather, as the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey noted in Henderson, “The factors that both judges 
and juries will consider are not etched in stone.  We expect that the 
scientific research underlying them will continue to evolve.”181  As the 
Henderson court recognized, the Manson framework can accommo-
date changing social science discoveries without threat to the frame-
work itself. 
Moreover, courts are well equipped to stay abreast of this new evi-
dence.  As demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham, 
the Supreme Court is fully capable of assessing the developments of 
relevant social science.182  Since the science in this area is well settled 
and changes to it will not affect the constitutional test itself, using so-
cial science to define suggestiveness and reliability will not create an 
unduly unpredictable standard. 
B.  Judicial Activism 
One may also argue that judges lack the institutional competence 
to weigh and assess social science evidence; this is a task best left to 
the legislature.  The specter of judicial activism encompasses two 
concerns.  First, one might worry that judges are not competent to as-
sess scientific facts.  Second, one may worry that unelected judges are 
not democratically accountable and, as such, are not the proper gov-
ernmental actors to be assessing legislative facts and creating policy 
around them. 
The courts are entirely competent to make an assessment of the 
social science evidence relevant to eyewitness identifications.  Here, 
courts are not being asked to make a policy judgment better suited to 
a legislature.  Rather, they are trying to adduce whether identifica-
tions in particular cases are reliable.  Trial courts routinely assess the 
validity of scientific evidence in the context of certifying expert wit-
nesses.  The Daubert standard requires courts to assess “whether the 
[proffered] expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge 
 
181 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011). 
182 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason to 
reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”). 
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that (2) will assist the trier of fact.”183  In making this assessment, the 
court must examine “whether the reasoning or methodology underly-
ing the testimony is scientifically valid.”184  Courts have engaged in 
this evaluation of scientific evidence for almost ten years. 
The anti-democratic concern is also not compelling in the case of 
eyewitness identifications.  In his book, The Least Dangerous Branch:  
The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, Alexander Bickel argued that 
“judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”185  He 
argued that judicial review was undemocratic, since, by allowing une-
lected judges to overturn legislation duly passed by a democratically 
elected Congress, it “constitute[s] control by an unrepresentative mi-
nority of an elected majority.”186  In light of this worry, one might ar-
gue that even if judges are competent to analyze social science evi-
dence, they should not do so; rather, limitations on eyewitness 
evidence should be made by the people through the legislature. 
This argument is unconvincing because the interests of those who 
are protected by due process protections, people accused of commit-
ting crimes, are a minority and cannot adequately represent their in-
terests in the legislative process.  According to Erwin Chemerinsky, 
“Constitutional law should begin with the idea that society should 
have an institution, the Court, that is not popularly elected or directly 
electorally accountable identify and protect values that are sufficient-
ly important to be constitutionalized and safeguarded from political 
majorities.”187 
The people whose rights are at stake in determining the proper 
scope of criminal due process protections are criminal defendants.  
They are precisely those people that a counter-majoritarian institu-
 
183 Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). 
184 Id. at 592–93. 
185 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986). 
186 Id. 
187 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Forward:  The Vanishing Constitution, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 102 (1989).  This view is reflected in the famous footnote four of 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., which called for greater judicial scrutiny of statutes that 
target “discrete and insular minorities.”  304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  John Ferejohn and 
Pasquale Pasquino identify another benefit to counter-majoritarian Supreme Court rul-
ings.  According to them, “the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review is not a ‘dif-
ficulty,’ but an ‘opportunity.’  A countermajoritarian court can make it possible for a de-
mocracy to become more deliberative.”  John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The 
Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 360 (2010).  On this view, a 
counter-majoritarian ruling in favor of the rights of the accused would have the ad-
vantage of encouraging public deliberation on this issue. 
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tion is best suited to protect.188  As such, this is an area where judicial 
activism on the part of the Court is necessary, since the legislature will 
be unable, due to its majoritarian commitments, to adequately pro-
tect the rights of criminal defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
It is entirely appropriate and normatively desirable for the Su-
preme Court to use social science evidence to amend the Manson test.  
The Supreme Court’s precedents in this area do not adequately pro-
tect criminal defendants and have led to erroneous convictions.  
Criminal due process is an area of constitutional interpretation that is 
ideal for considering social science facts.  Since the standards of crim-
inal due process do not have firm grounding in traditional sources of 
constitutional interpretation, social science can provide a powerful 
tool in constitutional interpretation in this area. 
Moreover, the Court has defined the test in such a way that empir-
ical questions must be resolved in order to apply it.  In doing so, the 
Court has opened the door to social science research.  Which proce-
dures are suggestive and what factors contribute to the reliability of 
an identification are empirical facts.  These facts are necessary to in-
terpreting the Constitution in the Court’s framework.  In doing so, 
the Court should not ignore a robust and reliable source for those 
facts.  Relying on social science in this area will not constitute a radi-
cal departure from the Court’s past practice.  If there is an area 
where social science has something to add to constitutional interpre-
tation, this is it. 
The Court is not at risk of creating an unstable standard, since 
adoption of social science evidence will not necessarily call the stand-
ard itself into question.  Finally, the Court has a duty to make use of 
such facts in this area due to its counter-majoritarian obligations. 
Other scholars have argued forcefully that the Manson test is defi-
cient.  The Court should not put on blinders and ignore the vast 
body of knowledge developed by scholars in non-legal fields.  In or-
der to determine the contours of due process with regards to eyewit-





188 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 142–43 (2010) (describing the “collateral consequences” of criminal 
convictions, including the loss of the right to vote). 
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